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Abstract 
This paper investigates the evolution of wealth distribution in a one sector growth model along its 
transition path. A key feature of the model is that a household´s consumption cannot fall below a 
positive level each period. This requirement introduces a positive association between the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and household wealth. Households only differ in their initial 
holdings of capital. The model is calibrated to match some key statistics of the US economy. The 
level of inequality in the wealth distribution of our artificial economy has a n inverted Ushape. The 
level of wealth inequality and its evolution resembles that of the US economy. However, our model 
illustrates that the existence of a Kuznets curve is very sensitive tothe sources of growth: whether it 
is driven by productivity growth or capital accumulation. Additionally, our model predicts an 
upsurge in wealth inequality following the productivity slowdown in the 1970´s.  
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to assess how much of the U.S. wealth inequality observed
in the late XIXth and XXth centuries can be accounted for by the dynamics of a standard
one sector growth model. The key feature of our model is that a household’s consumption
cannot fall below a positive level each period. Households only di¤er in their initial hold-
ings of capital. We de…ne wealth as the household net worth: value of total accumulated
assets minus value of total liabilities. This de…nition coincides with accumulated capital
in our model. There is no uncertainty of any source in this model. We assume that
there exist perfect capital markets. This last assumption plus the existence of a minimum
consumption requirement imply that the Engel curves are a¢ne functions of the level of
wealth. This property of the model ensures that the distribution of wealth does not a¤ect
the aggregate dynamics of the model —provided that no household’s income falls below
the consumption requirement—, whereas the wealth distribution does change along the
transition path.
The model is calibrated to match some key aggregate statistics of the U.S. economy.
Once done this, we calibrate the wealth distribution of the initial period, which we take
to be 1870, so that it matches some of the U.S. historical data for that period. We …nd
that the evolution of the wealth distribution and that of the level of wealth inequality
in our arti…cial economy resemble quite well those of the U.S. economy. The level of
wealth inequality in our arti…cial economy increases at low levels of per capita income
and declines as the economy approaches the steady state, as the evolution of the U.S.
inequality does.
The evolution of wealth inequality depends on several things. First of all, the exis-
tence of a minimum consumption requirement introduces a positive association between
household wealth and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Savings rates will
be increasing with the level of household wealth. Thus, poor households will accumulate
capital at a rate not smaller than that of wealthy households only if the aggregate level
of income is high enough relative to the minimum consumption requirement. If income is
low they cannot undertake any savings (or they have to borrow) to …nance the minimum
consumption requirement. This e¤ect is enhanced by a large level of risk aversion. Thus,
depending on the combination of two parameters, the risk aversion parameter and the
minimum consumption level, the level of inequality will increase, decrease or display an
inverted U shape along the transition path.
Secondly, our experiments suggest that the evolution of wealth inequality is very sen-
sitive to the length of the transition path. The farther away is an economy from its
steady state when it starts a process of sustained growth, the longer the period of in-
creasing inequality and the higher its level. The length of the transition path depends
on the contribution of Total Factor Productivity growth (TPF, hereafter) and the ini-
tial level of aggregate capital. The higher the level of productivity growth, the shorter
the period of increasing inequality, if there is any. The reason for this is that the larger
the level of TFP growth the sooner the economy attains a level of income above which
poor households start accumulating capital faster than wealthy households. Thus, our
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experiments indicate that a Kuznets curve in wealth inequality cannot be considered as
a feature of the development process, as many authors argue (see, for instance, Deininger
and Squire 1998, ?). We are aware that the ongoing discussion refers to income inequality
rather than wealth inequality, but we want to make clear that we do not advocate the
existence of a Kuznets curve. We rather point out in this paper that di¤erences in Total
Factor Productivity growth may help us to understand the di¤erent wealth inequality
experiences observed across countries.
Finally, our model is able to predict an upsurge in wealth inequality following the
productivity slowdown that started in the 1970’s. The predicted rise in inequality is a of
magnitude similar to that experienced by the US economy.
The only source of wealth inequality in our model is di¤erences in savings rates across
households. Other authors have explored the link between di¤erences in savings rates
and the dynamics of the wealth distribution. Chatterjee (1994) investigates the wealth
distribution implications of a standard neoclassical model in which preferences are quasi-
homothetic: Engel curves are a¢ne functions of the level of wealth. The main di¤erence
between his approach and ours is the measure of wealth used. He investigates the evolution
of the distribution of life-time wealth: i.e., present value of life-time earnings plus the value
of accumulated capital, whereas we de…ne wealth as the household net worth. Chatterjee
proves that when a minimum consumption requirement exists, the distribution of life-time
wealth becomes more unequal along the transition path. We show that the distribution of
household net worth can either become more egalitarian or unequal along the transition
path, depending on the region of the parameters space considered. The calibrated version
of our model can account very well for the evolution of the U.S. wealth (net worth)
distribution along the late XIXth and XXth centuries.
Caselli and Ventura (2000) study theoretically the evolution of wealth distribution in
a framework similar to ours. They build a model in which households derive utility from
a privately produced good and a public good. There are perfect capital markets. The
public good in the utility function plays a similar role to a negative minimum consump-
tion requirement. They …nd a similar result: The evolution of the wealth distribution
exhibits an inverted U shape along the transition path. The main di¤erence between
their approach and ours is that they use a C.E.S. production function with a elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor less than one, while we use the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology. Thus, our model is able to replicate the standard long-run stylized
facts.
Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999) also study the link between capital accumulation and
inequality along the transition path and introduce a minimum consumption requirement.
They also generate a Kuznets curve for wealth inequality. As opposed to us, they use
a linear technology and calibrate their model to match some estimates for the Indian
economy.
The key departure of our model from the standard neoclassical framework is that we
introduce a minimum consumption requirement. A minimum consumption requirement
introduces a positive association between household wealth and the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution (IES). Wealthier households have a higher IES and, therefore, a
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higher savings rate. Using panel data on Indian villagers, Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), and
Atkeson and Ogaki (1997) …nd economically signi…cant di¤erences in the IES across rich
and poor households. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) also use Indian data and …nd a min-
imum consumption requirement to be statistically signi…cant and to amount to a sizable
fraction of consumption expenditures of the average household. Moreover, Rebelo (1992)
and Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996) argue that low savings rates and low elasticity of
savings with respect to the interest rate point to the existence of a minimum consumption
requirement. Thus, we think that a minimum consumption requirement is important to
understand the process of capital accumulation and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 shows some theoretical results and establishes the connection between
level of per capita income and wealth inequality. In section 4 we present the calibrated
version of our model and the results of our simulations. In section 5 we study the sensi-
tivity of the evolution of the wealth distribution with respect to the level of productivity
growth. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model economy
The model economy is a discrete time in…nite horizon economy, populated by a measure
one of households that live forever. Each period, households obtain utility from consuming
a commodity, Ct, that is produced using physical capital and labor. The representative
…rm uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce the consumption good,
F (Kt; Nt) = AtK
µ
tN
1¡µ
t , µ 2 (0; 1); (1)
where Kt denotes aggregate capital, and Nt denotes aggregate labor. At is the exogenous
technological progress factor that grows at rate °. Capital depreciates at a constant rate,
± 2 (0; 1): There exist perfect capital markets: i.e., individuals are able to borrow and
lend without any restriction at the market interest rate.
Households are endowed each period with one unit of labor. They do not value leisure
and di¤er in their initial holdings of capital, ki0, where i is just an index to rank the types
of individuals according to their level of initial wealth (physical capital). There are I
types of households. We assume that all types have the same measure. K0 denotes the
initial aggregate capital of the economy. Population grows at the rate ´. All households
have identical preferences de…ned over consumption at every date,
U =
1X
t=0
¯t (1 + ´)t u(Ct); ¯ 2 (0; 1): (2)
The variableCt denotes consumption per capita at period t: The one period utility function
is the following:
u(Ct) =
(Ct ¡ ®t)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ , ¾ > 1;
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where ®t denotes the subsistence level of per capita consumption at period t. We assume
that the amount of consumption considered a “primary necessity” varies with income.
The idea of the existence of a minimum level of consumption is often associated to the
existence of a poverty line. The perception of this poverty line or, what amounts to the
same, the level of consumption below which a person can be accounted as poor varies
within and across countries.1 We take the view that the minimum consumption level
increases with income. However, it is unlikely that the minimum level changes rapidly
with income within a country. We assume that the subsistence level of consumption grows
at the balanced growth rate of per capita income,
®t = (1 + g)
t®:
Although this assumption simpli…es the analysis, it is not strictly necessary to yield
the result. What will be essential is that the minimum consumption grows at a rate not
greater than that of the economy.
2.1 The …rm’s problem
The …rm faces a series of static one-period pro…t maximization problems,
max
Kt;Nt
A(1 + °)tKµtN
1¡µ
t ¡ wtNt ¡ rtKt (3)
The wage rate, wt, and the real rental price of capital, rt, are equal to the marginal
productivity of the production factors in equilibrium.
2.2 The household’s problem
In this subsection we specify the modi…ed model economy we are going to study through-
out this paper. This economy exhibits a balanced growth path, along which the rate of
growth of the per capita variables is g = (1 + °)
1
1¡µ ¡ 1. We detrain all the variables to
eliminate long run growth. Small letters denote the variables detrended. Once done this,
the household i’s problem can be written as
1On this regard, the 1990 World Bank Report (pp. 26-27) says,
A consumption-based poverty line can be thought of as comprising two elements: the
expenditure necessary to buy a minimum standard of nutrition and other basic necessities
and a further amount that varies from country to country, re‡ecting the cost of participating
in the everyday life of society. The …rst part is relatively straightforward. The cost of
minimum adequate caloric intakes and other necessities can be calculated by looking at
the prices of the foods that make up the diets of the poor. The second part is far more
subjective; in some countries indoor plumbing is a luxury, but in others is a “necessity”.
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max
fcit;kit+1g1t=0
1P
t=0
Át (c
i
t¡®)1¡¾
1¡¾
s.t: cit + (1 + g)(1 + ´)k
i
t+1  wt + (1 + rt ¡ ±)kit;
ki0 given
(4)
where Á = ¯(1+´)(1+g)1¡¾. The factor 1+´ is due to population growth and (1+g)1¡¾
is due to technological progress. This economy converges to a steady state without long
run growth. The evolution of prices and wealth inequality here is identical to that of the
original economy.
3 The transition path and the distribution of wealth
In this section we obtain the individuals’ demand functions and investment and the law
of motion of capital. Once done this, we turn to analyze the evolution of the wealth
distribution. First of all, we need to specify our measure of household i’s wealth at any
period t: We use as a measure of wealth total capital accumulated by a household at a
certain period, kit. In this respect, we depart from Chatterjee (1994). His measure of
wealth is present value of the total stream of income plus the accumulated wealth, i.e.,
life-time wealth:
1X
s=t
ps
pt
ws + (1 + rt ¡ ±) kit:
Using that de…nition he shows that wealth inequality worsens along the transition
path when there exists a minimum consumption requirement. This de…nition of wealth is
not very standard in the empirical studies. For instance, Wol¤ (1994) de…nes marketable
wealth (or net worth) as the di¤erence in value between total assets and total liabilities
and debt. Since the purpose of this paper is to assess quantitatively the importance of
capital accumulation to understand the evolution of wealth inequality, we prefer to use a
measure of wealth that can be readily compared to the data. Hereafter the terms wealth,
household wealth and capital holdings at any period t will be used with the same meaning.
If we refer to life-time wealth we will do so by its name.
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3.1 The demand function and the aggregate dynamics of the
model
Here we estate some properties of the household’s demand function. Solving the problem
for household i; (4), the household i’s demand function is
cit = ®+
1
Mt
Ã 1X
s=t
ps
pt
(ws ¡ ®) + (1 + rt ¡ ±) kit
!
; (5)
Mt =
1X
s=t
Á
s¡t
¾
µ
ps
pt
¶¾¡1
¾
: (6)
where pt is the price of consumption good in period t in terms of consumption good in
period 0. Function (5) says that the amount consumed above ® at period t is the fraction
1
Mt
of life-time wealth net of future needs of consumption.
The Engel curve is an a¢ne function of the level of wealth. This ensures that the
aggregate stock of capital next period does not depend on the distribution of wealth. This
result is due to the speci…c utility function used, the existence of perfect capital markets
and the assumption that individuals do not obtain utility from leisure. In this economy, as
in Chatterjee (1994) or Caselli and Ventura (2000), growth a¤ects the evolution of wealth
inequality, but inequality does not a¤ect growth. The dynamics of the aggregate variables
does not depend on the initial level of inequality and is identical to the dynamics of the
representative agent version of this economy. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the wealth
distribution and the …nal distribution in the steady state will depend on the initial level
of inequality. Next subsection discusses this point.
3.2 The evolution of the wealth distribution
Replacing the demand function shown in (5) in the household’s budget constraint, we can
obtain that the law of motion of household wealth follows
kit+1 = Bt +Dtk
i
t; (7)
where
Dt =
1
(1 + g)(1 + ´)
(1 + rt ¡ ±)
µ
1¡ 1
Mt
¶
; (8)
Bt =
1
(1 + g)(1 + ´)
"
(wt ¡ ®)¡ 1
Mt
1X
s=t
ps
pt
(ws ¡ ®)
#
(9)
We can also express aggregate capital in terms of factors Bt and Dt; kt+1 = Bt +Dt ¢ kt:
The factors Dt and Bt have ready economic interpretations. Factor Dt is the fraction of
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current wealth after interest rate has been paid that is not consumed at period t and,
therefore, is saved. Factor Bt is the amount of current labor income above ® that is saved.
Recall that 1
Mt
1P
s=t
ps
pt
(ws ¡ ®) is the fraction of present value of labor earnings above ®
that …nances excess consumption, cit ¡ ®, at period t: Hence, if Bt < 0, the households
cannot …nance consumption only with labor earnings and they need to either use capital
earnings, to deplete their stock of capital or to borrow.
To study the evolution of wealth inequality, let us de…ne X it as the ratio of individual
i’s wealth to aggregate capital, X it =
kit
kt
. Thus, the evolution of the ratio X it respect to
the average is given by
X it+1 ¡ 1 =
Dt ¢ kt
Bt +Dt ¢ kt (X
i
t ¡ 1) (10)
Expression (10) shows that the share X it+1 gets closer to (further away from) the aver-
age when the factor Dt¢kt
Bt+Dt¢kt is smaller (greater) than one. The value of that ratio depends
on the signs of the factors Bt and Dt. It is easy to check in expression (6) that Mt is
always greater than one. Therefore, the factor Dt is always positive. The factor Bt, how-
ever, can have either sign. Thus, we can already advance that the evolution of Bt governs
the evolution of the wealth distribution in this economy. The value and the evolution of
the factor Bt varies along the transition path of the particular economy we examine. For
instance, in an economy very close to its steady state in which households have a low
propensity to consume out of life-time wealth; 1
Mt
, we can expect Bt to be positive. On
the contrary, if at some period t current wage is nearly the minimum consumption and
1
Mt
is high Bt most surely will be negative. Hence, intuitively we can say that the value
of the factor Bt at any period t and, therefore, the evolution of the wealth distribution,
depend on how far an economy is from its steady state and its speed of convergence. We
will discuss this more thoroughly in the following sections
To analyze the evolution of the wealth distribution we …rst introduce the notion of
inequality. We give the de…nition of Lorenz-dominance in terms of our notation.
De…nition 1 Let all households be ordered according to their initial level of wealth. Let I
be the number of types of households according to their level of wealth. 1
I
Xit is the share of
wealth held by group i. Then, the distribution of capital at period t+1 is more egalitarian
than the distribution at period t if and only if it is satis…ed that for 1  J  I
JX
i=1
1
I
X it+1 ¸
JX
i=1
1
I
X it : (11)
The following Proposition relates the level of inequality, measured using the concept
of Lorenz-dominance, with the aggregate dynamics of our model.
Proposition 1 The distribution of capital at period t + 1 is more egalitarian than the
distribution of wealth at period t if and only if Bt is non negative.
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Proof. we can write expression (11) as
JX
i=1
1
I
¡
1¡Xit+1
¢  JX
i=1
1
I
¡
1¡X it
¢
; (12)
then, substituting (10) in (12) we obtain
Dt ¢ kt
Bt +Dt ¢ kt ¢
JX
i=1
1
I
¡
1¡X it
¢  JX
i=1
1
I
¡
1¡X it
¢
;
which holds true for Bt non negative. Recall that
JP
i=1
1
I
Xit should be less than or equal
to J
I
, which is the fraction of aggregate wealth held by groups 1 to J assuming capital is
evenly distributed across agents.
This Proposition states that in order to know the evolution of the wealth distribution
over time we just need to study the evolution of Bt.
4 Quantitative implications of the model
Now we turn to analyze the quantitative predictions of the model about the level of wealth
inequality along the transition path. To do so, we calibrate our model economy to match
some key features of the U.S. economy. The linearity of the Engel curves will allow us to
study this economy in two steps: we will analyze the evolution of prices and aggregate
variables in the representative agent version of this model and we will turn afterwards to
the full model to study the evolution of the wealth distribution.
4.1 Calibration
Our model is calibrated to replicate some statistics of the U.S. economy for the period
1949-1970. As Cooley and Prescott (1995), we assume that total capital is private …xed
capital plus the stock of durable consumption goods, the stock of government capital and
the stock of land. Consistently with this broad de…nition of capital, GDP includes the
imputed services of consumption durable goods and the government capital stock. The
share of capital consistent with these de…nitions of capital and GDP is 0.4. The implied
capital-output ratio is equal to 3.32. The steady state ratio output to consumption is
1.33. The rate of population growth, ´, is 1 percent per year and the rate of growth of
real per capita output, g, is 3 percent. Furthermore, we set the initial level of technology
A equal to 1. All these values are taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995).
Finally, we are left with the parameters ¾ and ®. Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) estimate
a value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for total consumption expenditures
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in the U.S. economy equal to 0.4 for the period 1968-1988. Thus we take 0.4 as the value
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES, hereafter) in the steady state,
IES =
css ¡ ®
¾ ¢ css = 0:4; (13)
where css denotes steady state per capita consumption. Since we have assumed ® to be
non negative, the equality (13) imposes an upper bound for ¾: it has to be less than
or equal to 2:5: We also believe reasonable to impose that ®=css should not be greater
than 0.4. We have the notion that the minimum consumption ® should be below 40
percent of css. These considerations restrict the region of values of ¾ to [1:5; 2:5] : We try
three di¤erent values for ¾, 1.5, 2.1, and 2.5: The last case corresponds to the standard
neoclassical model in which there is no minimum consumption requirement. In each case
the value of ® is chosen so that (13) holds.
We study the evolution of the model economy for these three cases. We summarize
the calibrated parameters in the following Tables:
Preferences Technology
Á ´ A µ ± g
0.9579 0.01 1 0.4 0.0344 0.03
Table 1
¾ ® ®=css
Case 1 1.5 0.67 0.40
Case 2 2.1 0.27 0.16
Case 3 2.5 0.00 0.00
Table 2
Table 2 shows that the level of minimum consumption as a fraction of steady state
consumption is lower the higher the value of ¾. This is because we are matching ® so
that the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution is 0.4 in the steady state. Just to have
an idea of what the fraction ®=css represents, we have computed the amount of food
expenditures as a fraction of non durable consumption expenditures. We have used data
reported in the National Income and Product Accounts for the period 1949-1970. This
fraction decreases over time and it is 21.0 and 15.6 percent in 1949 and 1970, respectively.
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4.2 Predictions on aggregate dynamics
We analyze in this subsection the properties of the dynamics of this model. First, we
need to set the initial level of per capita capital. King and Rebelo (1993) study the
transitional dynamics of the neoclassical growth model. They calibrate the initial level of
capital so that capital accumulation explains one half of the sevenfold per capita output
growth observed over the period 1870-1970. Cooley and Prescott (1995) estimate that the
contribution of capital accumulation to total growth in that period is around to one third
and that Total Factor Productivity explains the other two thirds. Then, we compromise
between the two numbers and assume that the contribution of capital accumulation is
0.4. Then, k0 should satisfy
F (kss; 1)
F (k0; 1)
= 70:4: (14)
Gordon (2000) reports that the average rate of growth of non-farm non-housing busi-
ness GDP was 4.42 percent for the period 1870-1913 and decreased to be 3.12 for the
subsequent period 1913-1970. We will use these numbers to assess the quantitative per-
formance of the model.
Figures 1a and 1b show the evolution of the aggregate variables for the di¤erent cases
considered. Figure 1a shows the evolution of output, consumption, and capital as a
fraction of their steady state value. The transition path is longest when ¾ = 1:5 since
the value of ® used implies the highest level of minimum consumption: 40 percent of the
steady state consumption. Nevertheless, in all the cases the transition is completed after
75 periods (this corresponds to the year 1944). The main di¤erences appear in Figure
1b, that shows the evolution of the savings rate, the capital-output ratio, the growth rate
and the factor Bt.
Notice that at the beginning of the transition, the growth rate of output is highest for
¾ = 2:5 and lowest for ¾ = 1:5. This is so because the minimum consumption requirement
as a percentage of average consumption is much higher in the economy with ¾ = 1:5; which
generates a much lower IES along the transition. The growth rate falls to 3.79, 3.60 and
3.57 percent after 30 periods, respectively for each calibration, and declines steadily to
be 3 percent. The implied average growth rate for the period 1870-1913 is 4.69, 4.73,
and 4.74 respectively for each case, being the highest rate for the case in which ¾ = 2:5:
Gordon (2000) reports that the average growth rate for that period was 4.42. For the
period 1913-1970 the average growth rate is 3.11, 3.10 and 3.09 for each case, whereas the
rate reported by Gordon (2000) is 3.12.
The economy with the highest savings rate is the one in which ¾ = 2:5 and the lowest
when ¾ = 1:5. The other case lies in between. Williamson (1991) reports that the gross
savings rate was 23 percent in 1870 and rose to 28 percent at the turn of the century. The
savings rate for each case in the initial period is 18.88, 26.42 and 29.38 and for all cases
it is around 25.8 percent at the turn of the century.
Williamson also reports that the return to conventional reproducible assets was 6.6
percent at the turn of the century. The evolution of the real interest rate is very similar in
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the four cases considered. It starts around 35 percent and drops to around 10.5 percent
after 30 periods (which corresponds to the year 1900 in our model). Thus, the interest
rate is higher in the model than in the data. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that
the interest rate of our model economy has no counterpart in the U.S. economy, since we
are assuming that aggregate capital includes government capital and consumer durables.
Thus, all the cases do not di¤er much in the aggregate evolution of all variables, but
in one: The evolution of the factor Bt. Figure 1b shows that if ¾ = 1:5 the factor Bt is
always negative and approaches zero as the economy gets closer to the steady state. This
implies that in this economy the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal along the
transition path. For ¾ = 2:5 the factor is always positive, therefore, inequality always
decreases. For ¾ = 2:1; Bt …rst increases and afterwards decreases. In this case the
evolution of the wealth distribution has an inverted U shape. Thus, the model is able to
generate a Kuznets curve. The next point is how much variation in inequality this model
generates along the transition path.
4.3 The evolution of inequality
In this subsection we analyze the size of the variation in inequality generated in the
transition path and confront our results to the —some authors would say scant— evidence
we have about the evolution of the U.S. wealth distribution. To do this, we divide the
individuals in ten groups and we …x an initial distribution of wealth across individuals.
The evolution of consumption, investment and capital across households are obtained
using expressions (5), (7) and the constraint of the individual problem (4). The Gini
coe¢cient is the index used to measure the inequality of wealth and income.
4.3.1 Historical evidence
There are no historical data on the evolution of the Gini coe¢cient of wealth for the entire
period 1870-1970. The existing data is very fragmentary but it gives us some clue about
how inequality evolved over time. The studies that most thoroughly analyze the data
available for that period are Lindert (2000) and Williamson (1991).
The evolution of wealth inequality in the late XIXth and early XXth centuries appear
to be controversial. Williamson (1991) reports that in 1870 the top 1 percent of all adults
held 27 percent of total assets, whereas the top 10 percent held 70 percent. The associated
Gini coe¢cient was 0.83. Since then until the years after World War II there is a gap
that some authors have …lled with fragmentary data. Table 3 contains data from Lindert
(2000). This data, although not directly used in this paper, gives us some idea of the
evolution of inequality. The table shows the net worth held by the top 1 percent of
individuals for selected years within the period 1890-1989. This share was 25.8 percent
in 1890 and peaked somewhere between 1913 and 1929, declining until 1976, year after
which it started rising again. This behavior is in line with the documented rise in wealth
inequality after the 1970’s. (See, for instance, Wol¤ 1994)
There is a gap between 1890 and 1922. Lindert (2000) asserts that inequality in
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America in 1929 was roughly the same as in England at that time. The same author
reports that the share of marketable net worth held by the top 5 percent of all adults was
78.9 at that year. This data combined with the data for U.S. in 1870 tells us that wealth
inequality should have risen within the period 1870-1929. We are aware of the fragility of
the evidence handled for this period. We just can say that there is evidence for a increase
of wealth inequality in that period and how much and exactly when it started it is still a
hotly debated issue.
Net worth held by top 1% of households
1890 1922 1929 1933 1939 1945 1949 1953 1962
25.8 36.7 44.2 33.3 36.4 29.8 27.1 31.2 31.8
1965 1969 1972 1976 1979 1981 1983 1986 1989
34.4 31.1 29.1 19.9 20.5 24.8 30.9 31.9 35.7
Table 3. Wealth inequality in the U.S., 1890-1989. Source: Lindert (2000).
4.3.2 Calibration of the initial wealth distribution
The initial distribution is chosen to match the data of wealth distribution for the U.S.
economy in 1870. According to Williamson (1991), the Gini coe¢cient of wealth was 83.3
percent and the share of wealth held by the top 10 percent of all adults was 70 percent
of the total amount of wealth and the share of the top 1 percent was 27 percent. For the
rest of the deciles, there is no available information. We choose to divide the households
in deciles and, therefore, we ignore the information about the share of the wealthiest
1 percent of the population.2 Many distributions of capital match the remaining two
statistics. We have conducted a number of experiments with di¤erent initial distributions
reported in Table 4, and the results are not changed in a substantial way. We present in
this paper those results obtained using distribution 1 shown in Table 4.
Decil 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Distrib. 1 0.10 0.53 0.59 0.90 1.01 3.17 5.40 8.09 10.1 70.09
Distrib. 2 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.50 2.42 3.40 6.40 7.00 9.75 70.09
Distrib. 3 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.62 2.01 4.00 6.45 7.60 9.00 70.09
Distrib. 4 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.60 0.82 3.90 6.88 7.35 9.43 70.09
Table 4. Initial distributions of wealth.
2We are aware that the individual wealth distribution is di¤erent of the household wealth distribu-
tion, but we do not have other inequality data for that year. Thus, we take Williamson’s data as an
approximation to the level of household wealth inequality.
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4.3.3 Comparing the cases to the data
Figure 1b already tells us that the model calibrated with ¾ = 1:5 predicts an ever in-
creasing level of wealth inequality, which we have not observed in the data. Likewise,
setting ¾ = 2:5 the model predicts that the level of inequality is monotonically decreasing
over time. Figure 2a shows the evolution of the Gini coe¢cient of wealth in the period
1870-1940. The model economy reaches the steady state in 1940 and thereafter the level
of inequality remains unchanged. Thus, we see that the model predicts an early surge in
inequality and a steady reduction afterwards. Thus, we think of the case in which ¾ = 2:1
as the one that best resembles the evolution of wealth inequality in the U.S. economy
among the four considered.
It can be argued that the data used to choose ¾ = 2:1 as the case that best matches
the data, instead of ¾ = 2:5 is too fragmentary and not su¢cient to make such a choice.
After all, the most reliable evidence is that of the post World War II years and it shows
that inequality kept decreasing during the entire period until the 1970’s. That is exactly
what the case in which ¾ = 2:5 implies: an ever reduction of inequality.
Tables 5 and 6 show di¤erent statistics that describe the household wealth distribution
in 1962 as reported by Wol¤ (1994) and compares them to the statistics delivered by our
model in the steady state.3 The de…nition of wealth used by Wol¤ is net worth: total assets
minus total liabilities. Notice how remarkably well the model predicts the distribution
of wealth when ¾ is set to be equal to 2.1. Thus, we take this case as the one that best
resembles the historical evidence we have on U.S. inequality. We will refer to this case
hereafter and it will be our benchmark.
Year 1962 Percentage share of wealth held by quintile
Top Second Third Fourth Bottom
Data 81.00 13.40 5.40 1.00 -0.70
Model, ¾ = 2:1 80.90 13.42 4.00 1.28 0.004
Model, ¾ = 2:5 71.64 14.42 6.43 4.13 3.39
Table 5
Year 1962 Percentage share of wealth held by
Top 10% Second 10% Bottom 80%
Data 66.90 14.00 19.10
Model, ¾ = 2:1 71.78 10.12 19.10
Model, ¾ = 2:5 61.53 10.10 28.36
Table 6
3Our model economy reaches the steady state after 75 periods, which corresponds to the year 1944.
Unfortunately, we have not found information on the wealth distribution across deciles prior to 1962.
Thus, we take the distribution of 1962 as a proxy for that of previous years.
14
4.3.4 The evolution of wealth and income inequality
Figure 2a shows that the Gini coe¢cient of wealth is 83 percent in the …rst period, reaches
86.74 percent after 9 periods, and decreases to be 84.3 thereafter. The Gini coe¢cient of
income is 33.3 percent in the …rst period, reaches 35 percent after 10 periods, a 8 percent
increase, and decreases to its previous. The experiment also shows that after 60 periods
there is little variation in the level of inequality. This accounts for the remarkable stability
of wealth inequality in the post-war U.S. economy.
4.3.5 Inequality across agents
Figure 2b shows the evolution of the shares of capital for 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 10th deciles,
respectively. The evolution of the shares mirrors that of the Gini coe¢cient of wealth:
Until period 13 the shares of 3rd, 5th, and 7th decrease, and that of the top decile
increases. After that period, the behavior is reversed. Figure 2c shows the savings rates
for the aforementioned deciles. The …rst thing that calls our attention is the enormous
di¤erence of savings rates across deciles: The households in the 10th decile save in the
steady state more than 50 percent of their income, whereas the saving rate of those in
the 7th decile is around 16.5 percent. Most of the aggregate investment is comprised by
the savings of the top decile: 67.25 percent of the investment in the steady state is due to
savings of the wealthiest individuals, being this fraction 73.99 percent at the peak of the
wealth inequality. These di¤erences in savings rates across wealth deciles are consistent
with Avery and Kennickell’s (1991) …ndings. They report that almost all the net saving
between 1983 and 1986 was made by the top decile of the 1986 wealth distribution.
4.3.6 Di¤erences in wealth and income concentration
Díaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1997) report that in 1992 the Gini coe¢cient for
income was 0.57 and that for wealth 0.78. Atkinson (1997) …nds that the Gini coe¢cient
for income in 1970 was around 0.40. This model, therefore, underestimates the level of
income inequality and overestimates that of wealth inequality. Two features of the model
may account for this: Agents are identical in their human capital and they do not value
leisure. The …rst assumption implies that the associated income distribution is always
going to be more egalitarian in our arti…cial economy than that of the U.S. economy. The
second assumption implies that labor supply does not vary with wealth. If labor supply
were endogenous, given the level of human capital, wealthier agents would supply fewer
hours in the market than the wealth poorer agents and, consequently, wealth inequality
would be lower. Thus, our model points out that in order to account for the concentration
of wealth relative to that of income, the wealth e¤ect on the labor supply should be small.
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4.4 Discussion of the results
In this subsection we want to discuss the key features of the model that deliver the result
on the evolution of the level of inequality in the benchmark case.
At low levels of income the wage is too low so that it only su¢ces to …nance the
minimum consumption ® or barely a little more (this corresponds to Bt negative). This
implies that poor households have to get indebted to …nance any amount of consumption
above ®. The amount of debt will be larger the smoother they want their consumption
path to be. Wealthy households …nance extra consumption using capital earnings and
still save a positive amount. Thus, wealth inequality widens. As the economy grows, the
wage grows to …nance excess consumption, so poor households’ level of debt decreases
(Bt still negative but decreasing in absolute value). Still, inequality widens since wealthy
households are increasing their stock of capital. There is a level of per capita income for
which the factor Bt becomes positive. Current labor earnings more than …nance current
consumption and poor households start paying o¤ their debt. After some periods, they
start accumulating a positive amount of capital at a rate higher than that of wealthy
households and, therefore, inequality starts declining.
Let us turn to the case in which ¾ = 1:5. In this case, ® is 40 percent of the steady state
consumption. This implies that at low levels of income poor individuals have to borrow
an amount so heavy (or to deplete their stock of capital so much) so that their share
of capital is always decreasing along the transition path. Another way of saying this is
that households want very smooth consumption paths (they have a very low intertemporal
elasticity of substitution) and therefore, incur in high levels of debt at low levels of income.
The economy grows at a very slow rate and by the time labor earnings are high enough
poor households are still paying o¤ debt and, consequently, inequality is ever increasing
along the transition path. The opposite occurs in the case in which ¾ = 2:5, case in which
inequality decreases along the transition path.4
5 Wealth inequality and the sources of growth
In this paper we have focused our attention on wealth inequality. We have seen that once
we introduce a minimum consumption requirement, the standard neoclassical growth
model can account for the observed pattern of wealth inequality in the U.S. economy
within the period 1870-1970. The level of wealth inequality in the model economy displays
an inverted U shape, as the available data suggests. Hence, the model delivers a Kuznets
curve for the wealth distribution, as well as for that of income. We prefer to remain
silent on this last respect since we have assumed that all households have identical level
of human capital and, hence, our model is not suited to analyze the evolution of income
4When ¾ = 2:5 the value of ® is 0: Therefore this is the standard model with homothetic preferences.
We do not mean to imply that with homothetic preferences inequality is always decreasing. For instance,
we have computed that setting ® = 0 and ¾ greater than 4 inequality widens along the transition path,
whereas it always decreases for lower values of ¾. There exists a value of ¾ for which inequality remains
constant along the transition path (results can be obtained from the authors upon request).
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inequality. In this section we want to analyze the forces that drive the existence of such
Kuznets curve. Intuitively, we can see that the length of the transition path is key for that
pattern in the evolution of inequality to appear. The length of the transition path depends
on the level of the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution and on the level of Total Factor
Productivity (TFP hereafter) growth. Here we want to explore the relationship between
the evolution of inequality and the level of TFP growth.
5.1 Total Factor Productivity growth or factor accumulation?
To analyze the importance of Total Factor Productivity growth in determining the evo-
lution of inequality we conduct two exercises. We simulate the evolution of the U.S.
economy within the period 1870-1970 assuming a TFP growth rate di¤erent from that
used previously. We make two new calibrations of the model along the following lines: we
change the value of the Total Factor Productivity growth rate in 20 percent of its original
value, which was 1.79 percent to account for a growth rate of 3 percent in the balanced
growth path. The change in productivity growth implies a balanced path growth rate of
2.40 percent, and 3.61 respectively in each exercise. The value of the rest of the param-
eters remains unchanged. Finally, to simulate the transition we need to choose an initial
level of capital. We choose the initial level of capital so that total growth in the period
1870-1970 is identical to that of the benchmark economy:
(1 + bg)T ¢ F
³bkT ; 1´
F
³bk0; 1´ = (1 + g)T ¢ F (kT ; 1)F (k0; 1) ; T = 99,
Values with hats denote values in the recalibrated model economy. kT is the value of cap-
ital in the benchmark economy at period 99 (which corresponds to 1970). bkT is obtained
so that aggregate capital in period 99 amounts to the same fraction of steady state capital
as in the benchmark economy.
Figure 3a shows the evolution of wealth inequality and capital in the case in which the
per capita income growth rate is 2.4 percent. The transition path is simulated assuming
a much lower level of initial wealth inequality; otherwise the poorer individuals’ income
would be below the minimum consumption requirement. The Gini coe¢cient of wealth is
0.60 at the initial period and increases for 13 periods, reaching a value of 0.8992. After
100 periods it decreases to 0.8260, being the percentage share of wealth held by the top
decile 87.17 per cent in 1962, whereas it is 81.00 in the data. Hence, inequality increases
further and for more periods. The key to understand the di¤erences is the length of the
transition. In this case, initial capital is 3.30 percent of its steady state value, whereas is
14.29 percent in the benchmark case. Thus, here the transition is longer.
The opposite occurs when the balanced growth path rate is assumed to be 3.61 percent.
In this case, shown in Figure 3b, we have taken the initial wealth distribution identical to
that of the benchmark case. Notice that inequality is always decreasing. Again, the key
17
is the level of initial capital relative to its steady state value. In this case, initial capital
is 61.85 percent of the steady state value, larger than in the benchmark case.
These two exercises suggest that the length of the transition path is key for the ex-
istence of a Kuznets curve in wealth inequality. The length of this transition depends
on the contribution of TFP growth and the initial level of capital. For any given level
of initial capital, the higher the rate of growth of TFP, the closer is the economy to its
steady state and, therefore, the shorter the period, if any, of increasing inequality. In
others words, the larger the contribution of capital accumulation to growth, the longer is
the period of increasing inequality.
For instance, let us think of the Ak model. In this model total growth is driven solely
by capital accumulation. It is easy to check from expression (9) that the factor Bt is
always negative, regardless of the level of aggregate capital. Therefore, inequality is ever
increasing: savings rates are increasing with capital holdings. Since the interest rate is
constant, this implies that the rate of growth of the capital shares is greater for wealthier
individuals. Hence, inequality is always increasing.
Thus, our results suggest that investigating this avenue could help us to understand the
di¤erent evolution of wealth inequality observed across countries. Since Kuznets (1955)
formulated his famous conjecture, there has been an ongoing discussion about whether
the Kuznets curve is a feature of development. The researchers that investigate this issue
focus their attention on income inequality, instead of wealth inequality. Deininger and
Squire (1998) and Fields and Jakubson (1992) are among the authors that more forcefully
reject the Kuznets curve as a feature of development. They argue that previous studies
that support the existence of the Kuznets curve use cross section data, whereas the initial
Kuznets’ conjecture concerned the evolution of inequality within a country.5 They also
show that when using panel data the Kuznets curve cannot be accepted as a stylize fact
of development: it appears as often as not for di¤erent countries.
Our results, referring to wealth inequality, are in line with their …ndings. First of
all, our model predicts that in any two countries identical in all respects but the initial
distribution of wealth, the initial di¤erence in wealth inequality will persist over time.6
Thus, cross section data will not be informative about the evolution of inequality over
time for a given country. Secondly, the exercises performed in this section suggest that the
evolution of wealth inequality within a country is very sensitive to the level of productivity
growth. Therefore, the Kuznets curve can appear as often as not in time series data.
5Fields and Jakubson (1992) argue that the Kuznets curve is not rejected by cross sectional data
because of the so called “Latin American e¤ect”. Latin American countries have the highest secular
levels of inequality in the world and most of them are middle countries. Thus, the cross section Kuznets
curve is served.
6It is easy to check that the Gini coe¢cient of wealth can be written as Gt+1 =
tQ
r=0
³
Drkr
Br+Drkr
´
¢ G0:
Therefore, any two countries that start a process of sustained growth with di¤erent level of inequality
will experiment similar evolution in the dynamics of inequality, but the levels will remain di¤erent at
each point in time.
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5.2 The productivity slowdown and the upsurge of inequality
In the last two decades many developed countries, U.S. among them, have experienced
an upsurge in their levels of income and wealth inequality. This phenomenon has been
documented by, among others, Atkinson (1997), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and
Wol¤ (1994). These observations, more than any study, refute the existence of a Kuznets
curve, in the sense that developed countries may experience, as any other poorer country,
a rise in inequality. On the other hand, over the period 1970-1990 the U.S. economy
experienced a slowdown in the growth rate of Total Factor Productivity, per capita income,
capital, and consumption. The previous discussion leads us to think that the decrease in
the economy growth rate may have a¤ected the evolution of the wealth distribution.
Here we want to explore the predictions of our model when we assume a change in
Total Factor Productivity growth rate as the one experienced in the U.S. economy during
the period 1970-1990. Several authors have measured the changes in the growth rate of
Total Factor Productivity. Gordon (2000), for instance, uses data for the period 1870-
1996. He uses as a measure of output that of the non farm non-housing sector. He …nds
that the rate of growth of TFP for the period 1870-1913 is about the half of its value
for the period 1913-1970 and much lower in the last period 1970-1996. We cannot use
his estimates since he uses a di¤erent measure of output and a di¤erent share of capital
in aggregate production. Thus, we have constructed a series for aggregate capital and
GDP consistent with our calibration procedure and computed the rate of growth of TFP
assuming that the contribution of labor is zero. This is also consistent with Cooley and
Prescott’s (1995) …nding that the secular contribution of labor to growth is negligible. We
have constructed these series using data from the National Income and Product Accounts
and they are available upon request. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the growth rate of
TFP in our sample. We have divided the whole sample in three periods, 1949-65, 1966-80
and 1981-99. The average for the second period is lower than those of the earlier and …nal
period. Speci…cally, the average rate of growth in the period 1966-1980 is 26.83 percent of
its previous value in the period 1949-1965. The average growth rate for 1981-1999 is 92.15
percent of its value in the …rst period. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the capital-output
ratio in those periods. Notice that it starts increasing in 1965, peaks in 1980 and falls
steadily thereafter to a level close to its level in 1965.
The exercise we conduct is the following: we assume that our arti…cial economy is in
its steady state in 1965. From there on we assume that the TFP growth rate is 26.83
percent of its previous value (which is 1.79 percent to obtain a steady state growth rate
of 3 percent) during the next 15 periods. This corresponds to the period 1966-80. After
this, we assume that the TFP growth rate increases to be 92.15 percent of its value in the
period 1949-65.
Thus, we proceed as if the economy moved from 1965 to 1980 to a new balanced growth
path along which the growth rate were smaller than the previous one. After that year we
proceed as if the economy moved to a new balanced growth path with a higher growth rate
in the steady state. In both cases we assume that those changes in the TFP growth rates
are totally unexpected and that households view them as permanent. Figure 6 shows the
evolution of the Gini coe¢cient for wealth and income, respectively, the growth rate of
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output and the capital-output ratio. Notice that the evolution of the capital-output ratio
in the model resembles closely that of the ratio in the data. Thus, our exercise predicts a
reduction in inequality in the 1970’s and an increase in the last period. These results are
in line with the data: according to Wol¤ (1994), wealth inequality increased substantially
during the 1980’s after a period of intense reduction during the 1970’s. Actually, wealth
inequality started rising in the mid-1970’s, but we should keep in mind that earnings
inequality also started rising at that time and that the only source of wealth inequality
in our model economy is di¤erences in the savings rates.
The intuition of the results is the following: the decrease in the TFP growth rate in the
period 1966-80 implies that the economy moves towards a new steady state in which the
capital-output ratio is higher than previously. Thus, households increase their savings.
Since the economy is fairly close to its new steady state, poorer households increase their
savings rate in a higher proportion than wealthier households and inequality decreases
along that path. In the period 1981-99 the rise in TFP growth rate makes the economy
to move towards a new steady state in which the capital-output ratio is lower than in the
previous steady state. A lower capital-output ratio implies a higher consumption-output
ratio for all households, regardless of their level of wealth. Since households want to
smooth consumption along the path, poorer households decrease their savings rate in a
higher proportion than wealthier households and wealth inequality rises.
Our experiment predicts a fall in the aggregate savings rate during the 1980’s, as it has
been documented by Avery and Kennickell (1991) and Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
(1991), among others. Moreover, the model predicts that the fall in the savings rate is
more severe among households in the low wealth deciles than among wealthier households.
This is why wealth inequality increases during that period in our model. The evidence
we have found about the behavior of the savings rates across deciles for that period is
indirect. Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) found that the decline in the savings
rate during the 1980’s was actually smaller among bonds and stockholders than it was
among households with no marketable …nancial assets. Wol¤ (1998) reports that more
than 43 percent of the wealth of the richest 20 percent of the households takes the form of
investment assets. In contrast, almost two thirds of the wealth of the bottom 80 percent
of the households was invested in their own home. This evidence leads us to think that
the decline in the savings rate of wealthy households was less severe than that of the
poor households, as our model predicts. Thus, our experiment suggests that di¤erences
is savings rates have played an important role in the rise of wealth inequality during the
1980’s.
6 Final comments
This paper has shown that a modi…ed version of the neoclassical growth model can account
very well for the observed evolution of wealth level and inequality in the U.S. economy
in the last century. The only source of inequality in this model is the initial distribution
of wealth. Households are identical in their levels of human capital and, thus, there is
perfect equality in the earnings distribution. It could be argued that a model that allowed
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for earnings inequality could account better for the evolution of the wealth distribution
in the U.S.. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that the correlation between earnings
and wealth is extremely low ( Díaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1997) estimate a
correlation of 0.23 using the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances).
We have made a key assumption: there are perfect capital markets. If there were any
borrowing restriction, inequality along the transition path would be lower and the level
of growth would be higher. We think that perfect capital markets is not a too bad as-
sumption. Poor individuals always have available informal markets or the family network
to borrow or to get insurance (see Townsend (1994), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989)).
The model predicts that the level of wealth inequality …rst increases and decreases
afterwards, remaining constant in the steady state. In other words, the evolution of wealth
inequality shows a Kuznets curve. Nevertheless, we argue that the Kuznets curve is not
a feature of the development process and that the relative contribution of each source —
capital accumulation and productivity growth— is key for the existence of a Kuznets curve
in wealth inequality along the transition path. Our experiments suggest that countries
with lower Total Factor Productivity growth should experience higher levels of wealth
inequality and for longer periods of time. We think that this path is worth investigating,
since the evolution of inequality di¤ers greatly across countries. Finally, this model is
able also to account for the upsurge in wealth inequality that followed the slowdown in
growth started in the 1970’s.
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Figure 1a. Aggregate transitional dynamics
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Figure 3b. Evolution of inequality when g = 3:61 percent.
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Figure 4. Rate of growth of Total Factor Productivity 1949-1999.
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Figure 5. Capital-Output ratio 1949-1999.
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Figure 6. Evolution of inequality, 1965-1999
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